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1. Introduction: Why “Aesthetic Disobedience”? 
 
It this paper I explore a concept of artistic transgression that I call aesthetic disobedience. 
By using the term “aesthetic disobedience,” I mean to draw a parallel with the political concept 
of civil disobedience. Acts of civil disobedience break some law in order publicly to draw 
attention to, and recommend the reform of, a conflict between the commitments of the legal 
system and some shared commitments of a community. Acts of aesthetic disobedience do the 
same in the artworld: they break an entrenched artworld norm in order publicly to draw attention 
to, and recommend the reform of, a conflict between artworld commitments and some shared 
commitments of a community. I argue that considering artistic transgressions under the concept 
of aesthetic disobedience highlights features of modern artworld practices that are often 
overlooked. Most significantly, it draws attention to the ways in which a wide variety of citizens 
of the artworld, including not just artists and performers but also members of the audience, can 
deliberatively participate in the transformation of the rules and boundaries of the artworld itself. 
 
It is almost axiomatic that breaking rules is an important engine of creativity and 
innovation in the modern artworld. To describe the beginnings of great art movements by 
pointing to transformative moments where the rules were fruitfully broken is a commonplace. 
Violations of the rules of harmony and resolution in tonal music by, for example, Wagner, 
Debussy, and Schoenberg; or the violations of established rules of perspective and representation 
by Manet, Cézanne, and Kandinsky have been at the center of how the history of European art 
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has been told since the 19th century. The use of political terms to describe transgressive elements 
of the artworld is also nothing new. One of the most common political terms, “revolution” and its 
cognates, is used to describe art movements, works, individual artists, or formal innovations. 
Uses of “revolution” range from the straightforwardly political (Andre Breton’s and Diego 
Rivera’s Manifesto for an Independent and Revolutionary Art, or Richard Wagner’s Art and 
Revolution) to a mixture of political and artistic descriptions (the uses of “revolutionary” that 
were deliberately linked to “musical Bolshevism” that upset Arnold Schoenberg, for example) to 
the rather ordinary art-historical descriptions of, say, E. H. Gombrich who routinely uses 
“revolutionary” to describe stylistic and formal innovations across historical periods.1 In 
contemporary usage, the term is so common as to have taken on the air of cliché. A quote 
attributed to Paul Gauguin, “In art one is either a plagiarist or a revolutionary”2 (usually edited to 
the pithier, “Art is either plagiarism or revolution”), is a slogan printed on a T-shirt.  
It is worth remembering that, in political philosophy, “revolution” is reserved for 
movements that aim to overturn the existing legal order and replace it with an entirely new one.3 
The application of the distinction between revolution and other forms of dissidence in practice 
proves to be tricky and, as we will see below, is often contested. Nevertheless, there is a clear 
difference, and it is important to maintain the distinction. If we take the standard for revolution at 
all seriously—that is, if we take it that revolution replaces a normative order with another one—
then it is rarely the case that the aims of artists really are revolutionary. Schoenberg and 
Stravinsky, in distancing their music from “revolution,” were at pains to argue just this 
(Schoenberg replacing “revolution” with the non-political and less radical “evolution,” for 
example).4 Moreover, it seems to me that the term is insufficiently sensitive to capture the 
distinctive character of a number of rule-breaking artistic practices.  
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“Aesthetic disobedience” better sheds light on much of what is interesting in certain 
transgressive actions in artistic practices. It does this in part because it does not so easily lose 
touch with the political correlate, “civil disobedience,” that motivates it and gives it sense. 
Retaining a connection to the structure of civil disobedience reveals an often overlooked 
characteristic of some of the most interesting acts of artistic transgression: the public and 
deliberative backdrop against which they occur and which they aim to shape. In Section 2, I set 
out the characteristics of civil disobedience. Roughly, an act of civil disobedience is a public 
communicative act that breaks a law in order to draw attention to and reform perceived conflicts 
between law and other shared normative commitments. In Section 3, I begin to illustrate the 
parallel characteristics of the concept of aesthetic disobedience with an example: Peter Handke’s 
Sprechstück (“speak-in”), Publikumsbeschimpfung (translated as Offending the Audience). Again 
roughly, an act of aesthetic disobedience is characterized as a public communicative act that 
breaks an artworld norm in order to draw attention to and to reform perceived conflicts between 
an entrenched norm of the artworld and other, broadly speaking, aesthetic commitments.5 The 
important question of who can engage in acts of aesthetic disobedience is addressed in Section 4. 
I argue that aesthetic disobedience is not limited to artists and performers. Rather, audiences are 
also capable of acts aimed at reforming entrenched norms of the artworld. This is a shift from the 
usual uses of “revolutionary” that focus almost exclusively on transgressive acts of artists. In 
light of the diverse possibilities for participation suggested in Section 4, Section 5 raises the 
question of what should count as an artworld norm that could be the target of aesthetic 
disobedience. Looking to a limit case testing the boundary between aesthetic disobedience and 
revolution, I show that Tania Bruguera’s participatory artwork Immigrant Movement 
International targets norms distinguishing the artworld from ordinary social and political 
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practice. This shows that what norms might count as candidates for aesthetic disobedience must 
ultimately remain open. 
 
2. Civil Disobedience 
 
Civil disobedience is familiar from political and legal philosophy.6 John Rawls’s 
influential definition states that an act of civil disobedience is a “public, nonviolent, 
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually one with the aim of bringing about a 
change in the law or policies of the government… intended to addresses the public’s sense of 
justice… within the limits of fidelity to law.”7 Every one of these characteristics has been 
criticized in various ways. Rawls’s conception of “public” includes notification of the authorities 
in advance of the disobedient action, along with acceptance of punishment for violating the law, 
for example. This would rule out, say, Pussy Riot’s performance of a “punk prayer” in Moscow’s 
Cathedral of Christ, or intersection blocking since these actions depend on sudden interruption 
and would be prevented by the authorities were advance notice given. The “non-violence” 
requirement is also stickier than Rawls makes it out to be. Not only is the definition of violence 
notoriously difficult to specify but violence might be seen as appropriate in the face of 
particularly abhorrent laws. Finally, it is not clear what, exactly, “within the limits of fidelity to 
law” means.8 While any discussion of the details of civil disobedience rightly becomes tangled in 
a web of complication, we can usefully give a broad-stroke sketch of its core features to establish 
a working definition. Acts of civil disobedience break some law in order publicly to draw 
attention to, and recommend the reform of, a conflict between the commitments of the legal 
system and some shared commitments of a community. This account calls attention to five 
central characteristics of acts of civil disobedience: 
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CD1. The acts violate the law  
CD2. Civil disobedients accept the risk of legal punishment for their actions9 
CD3. The acts are performed publicly—they are communicative 
CD4. The acts aim to draw attention to a conflict, or a set of conflicts, between normative 
and legal commitments or authority 
CD5. They aim to promote a change within the legal system.  
 
 
I take these to be necessary conditions of civil disobedience that distinguish it from ordinary 
protest (which need not break any laws), from ordinary law-breakings (which need neither to 
happen in public, to draw attention to any deeper normative commitments, nor to be aimed at 
promoting change), and from revolutionary acts (which aim to overthrow a particular 
institutionalization of norms altogether rather than promoting specific changes within the law). 
In classic cases of civil disobedience from the civil rights movement in the United States, 
particular laws were broken to call attention to the way that laws violated a deeper shared 
commitment of right or wrong. This shared commitment could be a morality, a conception of 
rights, liberty, fairness, justice, equality, and so on. 
CD3’s publicity requirement is broader and different in kind than Rawls’s publicity 
requirement—it simply aims to situate civil disobedience within the context of political 
deliberation. Laws are broken in order to communicate to other citizens reasons to change the 
law. The communication of reasons in a public sphere is not simply a one-way affair. Civil 
disobedients, in presenting reasons in a public and deliberative context, open themselves to  
countervailing reasons offered by their fellow citizens. In short, while civil disobedience is 
extraordinary in that it violates laws, is contestatory, and is confrontational; a democratic ethos 
of deliberation and communication forms part of its foundation.10 This very general account of 
the connection of the publicity requirement with deliberation should be enough to motivate the 
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arguments that follow. I leave the precise structure of deliberation vague in the hope of avoiding 
controversies within and between various accounts of deliberative and radical democracy, and 
what counts as violence or the “the limits of fidelity to law.”  
So far so good on civil disobedience, I hope. But why aesthetic disobedience? Before 
continuing to think abstractly about the parallel between the concepts of civil disobedience and 
aesthetic disobedience, I would like to set out the first of several examples that will both help 
motivate the need for a concept of aesthetic disobedience and put us in better position to start 
sketching some of its key characteristics.  
 
3. Aesthetic Disobedience: Peter Handke’s Offending the Audience 
 
In Offending the Audience (Publikumbeschimpfung),11 a work for theater by Peter 
Handke, the performers speak directly to the audience, about the audience, about what the 
performers are doing, and about theater in general. The performers claim that there will be no 
play, that the audience is the subject of the work, that the audience members are the objects of 
attention. Handke calls the work a Sprechstück, which has been translated into English as 
“speak-in”, echoing "sit-in", to capture their quality of performative protest. The speak-in 
culminates with a series of critical assessments of the audience juxtaposing cliché evaluations 
with blunt insults. “You were the right ones. You were breathtaking. You did not disappoint our 
wildest hopes. You were born actors. Play-acting was in your blood, you butchers, you buggers, 
you bullshitters, you bullies, you rabbits, you fuck-offs, you farts.”12 
Handke’s description of his aim resonates with the characteristics of civil disobedience 
where, rather than laws, the target of disobedience are artistic and aesthetic norms of the theater.  
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The idea was to have the spectators in the orchestra thrown back upon themselves. 
What mattered to me was making them feel like going to the theatre more, 
making them see all plays more consciously and with a different consciousness. 
My theatrical plan is to have the audience always look upon my play as a means 
of testing other plays. I first intended to write an essay, a pamphlet, against the 
theatre, but then I realized that a paperback isn't an effective way to publish an 
anti-theatre statement. And so the outcome was, paradoxically, doing something 
onstage against the stage, using the theatre to protest against the theatre of the 
moment-I don't mean theatre as such, the Absolute, I mean theatre as a historical 
phenomenon, as it is to this day.13 
 
Note that, while Publikumsbeschimpfung is a work of “anti-theatre,” it is not a revolutionary 
work that either breaks all norms of the theater or recommends throwing out all norms of the 
theater. Handke’s stage directions insist, “The usual theatre atmosphere should prevail… The 
concept of what is sartorially inappropriate should be strictly applied.”14 The norms of decorum, 
uniformity, silence, passivity and (in Handke’s eyes) apathy were to be made vivid before being 
challenged. The work aims to bring the audience to think and act differently about the theater, to 
get the audience to think and act critically about their role in the theater.  
A transformation of theater practice demanded an extraordinary, practical, and theatrical 
intervention. Only public performative engagement with, and violation of, the norms of theater 
would sufficiently illustrate the problem and deliberatively engage the theater-going public. At 
the 1966 German premiere in Frankfurt, the audience took the call to act critically in the theater 
quite seriously. They clapped, talked back to the performers, heckled, laughed and booed. During 
the performance on the second night, several audience members responded directly to the 
dialogue that was accusing them of being apathetic. While calling out and arguing with the 
actors, the (scripted) dialogue continued, “Standing, you would be more effective hecklers.”15 
The hecklers not only stood, but eventually walked onto the stage to join the performers and 
disrupted the performance. When suggestions from the actors and from Claus Peymann, the 
director, that they leave, were ignored, Peymann actually pushed them off the stage. The 
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exchange draws attention to the norms of the theater that the performers of 
Publikumbeschimpfung still clearly took to be in force and actually helped physically to enforce. 
In the first place, the actors stuck very closely to the written text, responding to hecklers with 
lines from the script in such a way that made it seem spontaneous. In the second place, the 
director enforced the rule that the participation of audience members is not to include their 
physically interfering with the performers on stage. So, Publikumsbeschimpfung publicly breaks 
the norms of the theater while drawing attention to the conflict between those entrenched, 
institutionalized norms and broader shared commitments of the participants of theatrical practice 
in order to promote a change in practice.  
We are now in a position to sketch an account of the characteristics of aesthetic 
disobedience that runs parallel to the sketch of civil disobedience from above: 
 
AD1. Acts of aesthetic disobedience violate a deeply entrenched artworld norm, or a set 
of norms. 
AD2. Aesthetic disobedients accept the risk of sanction for their actions. 
AD3. Acts of aesthetic disobedience are performed publicly—they are communicative 
AD4. Acts of aesthetic disobedience aim to draw attention to a conflict between 
normative commitments and entrenched norms of the artworld.  
AD5. Acts of aesthetic disobedience aim to promote a change within the entrenched 
norms artworld. 
 
Note first that while nothing in these necessary conditions for aesthetic disobedience 
entails a particular conception of art, they have a deep, and I think salutary, effect on historical 
and institutional theories by adding a deliberative dimension to the norms structuring artworlds. 
In particular, aesthetic disobedience calls attention to the ways in which moments of institutional 
transformation, along with the conferral of institutional authority can be, and often are reflective 
and deliberative. Where the institutional theory of art often assumes the existence and 
enforcement of a particular set of norms, and assumes that structures of authority are in place to 
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sanction innovation, taking the possibility of aesthetic disobedience seriously reveals the 
possibility of a more active and contestatory role open to citizens of the artworld.16 
These characteristics also distinguish acts of aesthetic disobedience from ordinary artistic 
innovation. For example, while Béla Bartók called for a number of innovative sounds to be 
drawn from stringed instruments (say, the “Bartók pizzicato” where the plucked string is snapped 
back onto the fingerboard so the tone is accompanied by a cracking sound), he did not violate the 
norms of string playing—making innovative sounds and timbres is part of the stock and trade of 
composers. The reader can easily multiply examples in all of the arts. At the other end of a 
spectrum of rule breaking, these characteristics also distinguish acts of aesthetic disobedience 
from revolutionary acts that do not promote change within entrenched artworld norms but, rather, 
aim to overthrow the artworld and replace it with another. As I mentioned above, distinguishing 
cases of revolution from cases of aesthetic disobedience is tricky, just as it is in the political 
realm.17 Cage’s 4’33” can be fruitfully understood as a revolutionary work. Whether it itself 
counts as music, it aims to completely restructure the way we understand, experience, perform, 
and compose music. The fact that it is a revolutionary violation of norms might play some part in 
an explanation of why there is a debate over its status as music. 
One question that immediately arises concerns the nature of AD1’s “deeply entrenched 
artworld norm” that is being broken in cases of aesthetic disobedience. In the case of civil 
disobedience, breaking a law is a fairly straightforward matter. Laws, especially in modern 
bureaucratic states, are relatively clearly (though not perfectly clearly) codified and 
institutionalized in a way that artworld norms are not. This is not a fatal worry, however. It is not 
part of the concept of law that laws be perfectly clearly codified or written down—unwritten 
elements of the common law are no less law for not being formally codified, for example. So 
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acts of civil disobedience do not depend on the ease of the identification of law. Still, one might 
rightly note that, whatever difficulty attends the identification, the norms of the artworld are not 
identified in the same way that laws are. The laws of the state are identified with reference to the 
authoritative sources of those laws.18 The sources of artworld norms are more varied and their 
authority is less formal than the sources of law and the sanctions for violating artworld norms are 
not nearly as weighty as the sanctions possible for violating the law. Nevertheless, there are clear 
cases of norms that have the entrenched status of law, and whose violation provoke relatively 
clear and significant reactions from various authorities in the artworld (critics, art institutions, 
academies, and other artists, for example). Examples of violations of formal artistic norms might 
include Schoenberg’s and Stravinsky’s breaking of the norms of tonality or Duchamp’s or 
Warhol’s breaking the norms of the kind of object that can count as a work of art. A widespread 
network of practices and institutions contribute to the entrenchment of the norms and their 
sanctions, which are risked by artists and meted out by critics, gallerists, museum directors, 
granting agencies, and a variety of educational institutions. This leads us a question that might 
arise with regard to AD2: what sanctions do aesthetic disobedients risk facing when they violate 
an entrenched norm? The sanctions for violating formal norms range from widespread negative 
critical reviews, denial of reviews altogether, or the loss or denial of exhibition or performance 
opportunities. In some cases, sanctions for violations of artworld norms can be every bit as 
weighty as the violation of laws. One need only think of the treatment of avant-garde art in 
totalitarian regimes in the middle of the 20th century to have a number of particularly vivid 
examples.  
At this point, one might worry that any violation of a norm counts as aesthetic 
disobedience. For example, one might wonder whether I am just pointing to what Kendall 
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Walton would call contra-standard properties that “have a tendency to disqualify a work from a 
category in which we nevertheless perceive it.”19 Works exhibiting contra-standard properties are 
the bread and butter of artistic innovation and capture a far broader spectrum of artistic 
innovation than aesthetic disobedience does. What is the difference? It may well be that all 
artistic acts of aesthetic disobedience produce works with contra-standard properties. But, as we 
will see shortly, not all acts of aesthetic disobedience are artistic acts. But even among artistic 
acts, there is no requirement that works exhibiting contra-standard properties either aim to draw 
attention to a conflict between normative commitments and entrenched norms of the artworld 
(AD4) or that they promote a change within artworld norms (AD5). Works exhibiting contra-
standard properties might simply break the rules without any aim to reform or call attention to 
the structure of artworld norms themselves. Even if they do aim to reform or call attention to 
norms (as Walton says they often do), they may do so either in an aesthetically disobedient or in 
a revolutionary manner.  
Even if one were to grant everything I have argued so far and admit that such deeply 
entrenched formal norms parallel to laws are possible, one might still think that they are a thing 
of the past in the contemporary anything-goes artworld. Aesthetic disobedience might do nothing 
more than open an explanatory space for philosophers, critics and historians as they talk about 
certain artistic acts and works that occurred before the end of art, to borrow a phrase from 
Danto.20 I would respond that the concept of aesthetic disobedience is of more than mere 
historical interest. The reason for this, while first appearing to be quite simple, has far-reaching 
ramifications: not every norm relevant to the creative movement of the artworld is a formal 
norm. Street art can serve as a clear example of what I am after here. The transgression that one 
might think central to street art is not its violation of formal norms of visual art, but the violation 
	   12	  
of the norms of where, how, by whom, and for whom art is displayed. Nick Riggle argues that 
something is street art if and only if “its material use of the street is internal to its meaning.”21 As 
a result, “Street art is deeply antithetical to the artworld. That is, for each part of the artworld, 
street art resists to some appreciable extent playing a role in it,”22 insofar as its material use of 
the street prevents attempts to bring it into galleries and museums as well as attempts to make it 
marketable and sellable. The norms broken here are not formal norms of visual artworks but a 
variety of institutional norms of the artworld governing the dissemination, display, and even 
ownership of artworks.  
When institutional norms are included among the possible targets of aesthetically 
disobedient acts, the realm of disobedient action is opened to a much wider constituency than we 
had initially been considering. Typically, when we speak of revolutionaries in art we speak of 
artists and performers. Broadening our focus, as I think we should, beyond breaking the formal 
norms of an art form opens the possibility of disobedience to a wider field of artworld 
participants. The Handke stage-stormers mentioned above show us one important possibility: 
acts of aesthetic disobedience committed by the audience. 
 
4. Aesthetically Disobedient Audiences 
 
There are a number of well-known examples of audience disruption and protest in 
musical performance—the audience’s reaction to the 1861 Parisian premiere of Wagner’s 
Tannhäuser caused it to be pulled after only three performances and the raucous premiere of 
Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring is notorious. I would like to focus on a more recent example. Since 
1938, as a response to the atrocities committed by the Nazis, there had been an unofficial ban on 
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the live performance of Wagner in Israel. In 1984, Zubin Mehta attempted to perform the prelude 
from Tristan und Isolde as an encore at an Israel Philharmonic Orchestra concert. Before 
performing the encore, Mehta turned to the audience and suggested that those for whom the 
music was disturbing could leave. There were boos and several people did leave. The ones that 
remained continued to boo, but ultimately fell silent as the music rose in volume. The second 
night, however, there was a more concerted protest. The boos were more unrelenting and Mehta 
was forced to stop the performance. Several versions of the story have a survivor climbing on 
stage and touching Mehta’s arm to stop him.23  
The audience members violated two powerful norms that govern the space of classical 
music concerts. The first is the norm of silence in the concert hall during the performance. By 
vocally expressing their displeasure about what was being performed, the audience 
communicated their condemnation of Mehta’s choice of encore. Moreover, there was no 
mistaking what they were objecting to—it was the choice to perform a work by Wagner in Israel. 
During the first performance, the disobedients submitted to the authority of Mehta’s continued 
performance of the work, aided by the sheer power of the sounding work itself. In the second 
performance, this authority was defied and the performance was stopped. What was at stake were 
deep competing commitments within music. On the one hand, Mehta, along with Daniel 
Barenboim years later,24 clearly believed that Wagner’s music itself did not embody the values 
that the Nazi’s used it to support. If he thought it did, he would doubtless refuse to perform 
Wagner. This commitment to a kind of formal purity or autonomy of music still runs deep in 
contemporary “classical” musical practice—so deep that Barenboim later referred to it explicitly 
in his arguments in support of performing Wagner.25 To interrupt a performance for moral and 
political reasons is to make a statement about the relationship between those commitments and 
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the commitment to music’s purity. It either calls this purity into question altogether, or it allows 
it to have some pro-tanto value that is defeasible by countervailing moral and political values. 
One need not focus exclusively on political examples, however. Even mundane acts of 
booing, noisemaking, tomato or turnip throwing, when sufficiently disruptive and aimed at a 
sufficiently entrenched norm, could count as aesthetic disobedience. For example, in the 
2000/2001 season at La Scala, Salvatore Licitra played Manrico in Il Travatore. In two places in 
the well-known 3rd act cabaletta, “Di quella pira,” tenors traditionally interpolate high C’s for 
the written G’s below high C in a bravado show of virtuosity. In deference to the score, and 
against the operatic performance tradition, Ricardo Muti instructed Licitra to follow the score.26 
The decision was vigorously catcalled and booed when Licitra sang the less impressive, but 
actually specified G’s. Here again the authority of the conductor and performer is challenged, 
along with the very strong commitment to obeying the score. The audience was committed to the 
countervailing commitment to virtuosic display in La Scala. These instances of audience-led 
aesthetic disobedience publicly and communicatively broke prominent norms of the European 
musical artworld. They shed critical light on a conflict between normative commitments of the 
musical public, and it called for a change within the institutionalization those commitments.  
An objection might be raised here that an audience’s disobedience in these cases does not 
amount to aesthetic disobedience since, unlike the acts of artists, the audience’s acts are not 
themselves aesthetic, or do not produce relevantly aesthetic results. I do not think this is the case, 
as long as we have a sufficiently nuanced characterization of the act and of performances. The 
stage-stormers’ intervention during the performance of Publikumsbeschimpfung is, I think, a 
clear case that supports my view. The audience members claimed the mantle of performer, taking 
the argument of the script very seriously. They performed their understanding of the conclusion 
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of the speak-in: they, too, could be authoritative speakers in the space of the theater. In standing 
and arguing, and then climbing onto stage, they restructured the space of aesthetic appreciation 
while drawing attention to and criticizing aspects of that very space.27 In a similar way the noisy 
and vocal intervention during the performance of instrumental music dramatically reshapes the 
structure of the performance event. Even if the music continues during the booing (as it did in the 
case of Mehta’s first performance of the Prelude of Tristan, or in the three 1861 Paris 
performances of Tannhäuser before its cancellation), it is continuing in the face of or in spite of 
the boos. The boos come to mark the performance and, depending on the effectiveness of the 
protest, they can come to mark the work and to shape its future performances.28 More important, 
though, acts of aesthetic disobedience led by audiences, as we see in the case of attempts to 
perform Wagner in Israel or an even more recent case of the cancellation of Burkhard 
Kosminski’s Nazi-themed Tannhäuser in Düsseldorf, can have a deep impact on artistic 
practice.29  
The aesthetic nature of audience-led disobedience is more vivid in cases in the visual arts 
where the marks left on the work by protest are often literal. In 2001, Jake and Dinos Chapman 
bought a rare complete set of prints from Goya’s famous and influential Disasters of War series. 
The artists “rectified” the prints by painting puppies and clown faces over the faces of the 
victims of war and titled their series 2003 Insult to Injury.30 The defacing of a revered work was 
condemned by a number critics as nothing but artistically shallow, merely shocking violation, 
desecration, and vandalism. Upon learning about what the Chapmans had done, but before seeing 
the works, the art critic Jonathan Jones thought the project was “nasty, insane, deviant.”31 The 
artists claimed that the paintings were not vandalism, and were not simply aimed to shock. 
Rather they meant to “kick the underbelly” of what they took to be Goya’s portrayal of 
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Enlightenment struggle with irrationality. “Because he has a predilection for violence under the 
aegis of a moral framework. There’s so much pleasure in his work.”32 In the context of the onset 
of the Iraq war, the critique of the violence of moralizing has a broader political significance. 
More important for my purposes here, though, the Chapmans aimed to highlight and lampoon 
what they take to be the easy, unreflective, and uncritical humanistic moralizing of contemporary 
museum patrons, audiences, and critics. After Jonathan Jones actually saw the rectified prints, he 
“fell into [the artists’] trap” and deemed them “nasty, psychotic and value free; not so much a 
travesty of Goya as an extension of his despair.”33 In working both with and against Goya, the 
Chapmans are at the same time aesthetically disobedient audience and artist.  
Distinguishing between acts of aesthetic disobedience and acts of mere vandalism is not 
always easy in practice, as the dispute between critics of Insult to Injury shows. On the one hand, 
there are clear cases of mere vandalism. For example, the security guard who drew a heart and 
wrote “Reggie + Crystal, I Love you Tushee Love Buns” on Roy Lichtenstein’s Curtains merely 
vandalized the painting—neither AD4 nor AD5 is satisfied. On the other hand, there are cases 
that are unproblematically identified as acts of aesthetic disobedience but that are perhaps 
unjustified. If we take an act to be unjustified, it might tempt us to label an act of aesthetic 
disobedience as mere vandalism. But this would be a mistake. For example, in February, 2014 at 
an exhibition of Ai Weiwei’s work at the Pérez Art Museum in Miami, Florida. The exhibition 
included several 2000 year old Han Dynasty vases that Weiwei had dipped in paint. The vases 
were accompanied by the famous photo triptych of Weiwei dropping and smashing a similar 
vase. Florida artist Maximo Caminero, to protest what he saw as the museum’s failure to support 
local artists while spending enormous sums on international exhibitions, performed a vase 
smashing of his own using Weiwei’s work. He picked up and dropped one of the painted vases to 
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mimic Weiwei’s actions depicted in the triptych.34 Weiwei, the museum, and much of the 
artworld have condemned the act as mere vandalism, though I take it to be a clear, if perhaps 
incompetent and unjustified, act of aesthetic disobedience. The question of whether or not an act 
is justified is distinct from its categorization as aesthetically disobedient. Since it is part of the 
nature of aesthetically disobedient acts that they violate a deeply held norm and this violation 
evokes shock and condemnation, it should come as no surprise that the acts are characterized by 
their opponents as merely transgressive, merely disruptive, merely shocking, or mere vandalism. 
Nevertheless, even though categorizing individual cases is bound in practice to be contested and 
to be tangled with the distinct questions of an act’s justification, the public commitment to 
reforming artistic practice—AD3-AD5 taken together—should be sufficient to distinguish 
vandalism from aesthetic disobedience.  
In this section we have seen that, while artists often provide us with the clearest cases of 
aesthetic disobedience when they break deeply held formal norms with the aim of reforming 
artworld practices, audiences can also engage in acts of aesthetic disobedience. This broadly 
deliberative and participatory core of aesthetic disobedience draws our attention to the ways that 
audiences shape our aesthetic and artistic practices in much the same manner as artists do. 
Whereas the agents of revolution are generally taken to be artists and perhaps artworks, aesthetic 
disobedience countenances, and even foregrounds, the participation of a broader cross-section of 
the citizens of the artworld. What distinguishes these audience-led acts of aesthetic disobedience 
from mere disruption or mere vandalism, which they can closely resemble, is the public 
commitment to reforming artworld practice.  
When participation in aesthetic disobedience is opened to such a wide variety of actors 
the question arises, what counts as an artworld norm that an aesthetic disobedient might target? 
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So far, we have seen that formal norms of artworks and genres might be targeted, along with any 
number of norms of presentation and reception within a particular artistic practice. Rather than 
attempting to canvass or categorize all types of artworld norms that might be contested, I will 
consider what I take to be a limit case of a work that calls the very boundaries of the artworld 
itself into question. A case of aesthetic disobedience on the border with revolution, the example 
will ultimately show that the question of which norms might be appropriate targets for aesthetic 
disobedience must not only remain open, but inevitably remains a matter of contestation.  
 
5. The Limits of Aesthetic Disobedience: Tania Bruguera’s Immigrant Movement 
International 
 
Tania Bruguera has worked with Creative Time and the Queens Museum of Art in New 
York on a long-term work of public art entitled Immigrant Movement International (IMI). IMI’s 
website describes the work as follows: “…[IMI] took on the form of a community center, paying 
respect to the tradition and victories of U.S. civic movements. [IMI] is an art project 
implementing the concept of Useful Art, in which artists actively implement the merger of art 
into society’s urgent social, political, and scientific issues.”35 The artwork “took the form of a 
community center” that provides workshops giving legal advice, cooking and urban gardening 
advice, health classes from a variety of cultures, English through Art History workshops, music, 
art and dance classes for both children and adults. IMI produces occasional “performances” that 
mostly advocate “progressive immigration reform,” and look very much like, in fact they are 
often indiscernible from, political demonstrations. Finally, the members of IMI have recently 
drafted a “Migrant Manifesto” that has been published online.36   
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What artworld norms are challenged here? The answer lies in the most frequently raised 
question about IMI. Tom Finkelpearl, the director of the Queens Museum, has said that the 
predictable question, “Why does IMI qualify as art?” is frequently raised to him by donors, 
board members, critics, newspaper reporters, and even by participants in the work itself.37 What 
really distinguishes IMI from a community center? One might reach for an institutional answer: 
it is a work because Bruguera, Creative Time, and the Queens Museum say it is. As much as 
Bruguera is committed to moving within and using the institutional authority of the artworld to 
achieve her own ends, she does not simply assume that this authority is what constitutes her art 
as art. Instead, she advocates for a view that art and artist’s obligations, as artists, reach beyond 
the boundaries of the artworld as they are institutionalized by museums, galleries, and funding 
agencies. In her “Introduction to Useful Art,” Bruguera makes the following suggestive claim:  
All art is useful, yes, but the usefulness we are talking about is the immersion of 
art directly into society with all our resources. It has been too long since we have 
made the gesture of the French Revolution the epitome of the democratization of 
art… We need to focus on the quality of the exchange between art and its 
audience.38 
 
Bruguera’s goal, then, is to highlight the sources of the norms of the artworld, drawing them 
closer to the audience in a gesture toward democratization of artistic practices. The “quality of 
exchange” to be focused on draws on the activity and creativity of the audience, bringing them 
into the creative act of art-making. IMI is an exemplary work of Useful Art, and shows why 
Useful Art is often included under the broader category of Participatory Art.39 Being directly 
immersed in society means that the aims of participatory works depend on what the participants 
do as co-creators of the works. These aims often call into question the artworld authority that 
allowed them to be pursued in the first place. In Bruguera’s IMI, the particular structure of the 
institutional authority of the artworld is made to serve works of Useful Art, which themselves 
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contest the particular institutionalization of the authority of the artworld. It is no wonder, then, 
that the central question concerning IMI is whether it counts as art. At its very heart, the work 
challenges what it is to be a work of art along with the obligations and responsibilities that 
accompany that designation.40 
Is IMI, therefore, simply a revolutionary gesture that aims to abolish the boundary 
between art and non-art? I think not. Bruguera’s work achieves many of its ends because it 
claims for itself the mantle of art and through the very questioning of why it counts as art. The 
institutionally maintained boundaries of the artworld are retained, taken advantage of, and 
valued, even as the particular shape of the institutionalization is criticized. Had Bruguera 
advocated or performed an erasure of the boundaries between artworld and the social and 
political worlds, hers would be an act of aesthetic or artistic revolution. Aesthetic disobedience, 
by contrast, pairs the defense of broad artworld commitments with criticism of their specific 
institutionalization.  
So while it does not seem to me that Bruguera’s work amounts to a revolutionary gesture, 
others might disagree. That there might be disagreement about radical cases, especially at or near 
the moment of disobedience, should not be surprising. This is more than a mere fog-of-war 
epistemic worry, though. It points to what I take to be interesting about aesthetic disobedience. 
Namely, it shows that aesthetic disobedience, as a deliberative gesture, involves moving citizens 
of the artworld to see that they share certain normative commitments that are being violated. An 
aesthetically disobedient act draws attention to a conflict in normative commitments that the 
citizens of the artworld may not have noticed, and about which they may need convincing. It is 
perfectly natural, then, for an aesthetically disobedient act to look like many things to different 
citizens of the artworld especially in the midst of deliberation over what is, in its essence, a 
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contested topic. Where structuring norms of an artworld are questioned, as in IMI, it might be a 
matter of reasonable dispute whether it is a case of revolution or aesthetic disobedience.    
We are now in a position to answer more fully the question asked at the end of the 
previous section, “What qualifies as an artworld norm that an act of aesthetic disobedience might 
target?” On the one hand, works of aesthetic disobedience like Bruguera’s draw on and 
performatively affirm at least some of the established authority of artworld practices. On the 
other hand, part of the point of aesthetic disobedience, and Bruguera’s work is an example of 
this, can be to call into question the shape of the boundaries of the artworld. This can range from 
straightforward cases of formal innovation and violation in which artists like Stravinsky and 
Schoenberg trafficked; it can include a variety of disruptive audience interventions; or, in 
extreme cases like Bruguera’s, the targeted norm might involve the distinction between artworld 
and the contemporary social-political world. In practice, this makes it difficult to distinguish 
sharply between acts of aesthetic disobedience and aesthetic revolution. Since some of the very 
boundaries of an artworld might be called into question, we need to leave open a characterization 
of the norms that might be targeted by acts of aesthetic disobedience.41 	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